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8Non-ﬁnancial Reporting for business enterprises
An effective tool to address human rights violations?
sebastian eickenja¨ger
Between 2005 and 2008, world food prices rose by 83 per cent, maize
prices almost tripled, wheat prices increased by 127 per cent, and rice
prices by 170 per cent.1 The Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO) estimated that in 2008 more than 40 million
additional people were pushed into hunger as a consequence of the food
crisis,2 and in 2009 the FAO stated that for the ﬁrst time since 1970,
more than one billion people in the world were suffering from hunger.3
In 2011, global food prices reached another peak and in 2013 the FAO
declared that there had been progress in the last years but ‘it is
insufﬁcient overall to achieve the hunger reduction goals’.4
At the same time, the ﬁnancial sector experiences a boom in the
trade of raw materials on global ﬁnancial markets, that is, a boom in
the trading in commodity derivatives. The share of agricultural com-
modities within capital investments in raw materials increased to one
fourth, about 100 billion US dollars. From 1998 to 2008 the invest-
ment volume in commodity index funds increased from 3 to 174
billion US dollars.5 In general, the participation of speculators and
non-traditional investors (e.g., hedge funds and large banks) at the
commodity futures exchanges increased rapidly and turned traditional
actors into a minority.6 Speculation on agricultural commodities leads
1 Mittal, ‘The 2008 Food Price Crisis’, p. 1.
2 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), ‘Number of Hungry
People Rises to 963 Million’.
3 FAO, ‘The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2009’, p. 4.
4 FAO, ‘The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2013’, p. 9.
5 Oxfam Germany, ‘Mit Essen Spielt Man Nicht!’, p. 7.
6 For an overview of the participating market actors and the changes at the commodity
future exchanges see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
and Arbeiterkammer Wien, ‘Price Formation in Financialized Commodity Markets: The
Role of Information’, pp. 18–9.
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to a ‘ﬁnancialization’7 of the agricultural trade markets. Many non
governmental organisations (NGOs) and some scientists argue that this
‘ﬁnancialization’ is one cause for extreme ﬂuctuations and an increase of
food prices that has serious impacts on the urban and rural poor in Low
Income Food Deﬁcit Countries (LIFDC) or the poorest development
countries.8 Olivier De Schutter, UN Special Rapporteur on the right to
food, stresses the ‘negative effects of speculation on basic food com-
modities’ and highlights that ‘a signiﬁcant portion of the increases in
price and volatility of essential food commodities can only be explained
by the emergence of a speculative bubble’.9
The alleged impacts of food speculation on world hunger are exem-
plary for complex correlations between business and human rights in
times of globalisation. Human rights violations often cannot be traced
back to a speciﬁc business action. They often appear as violations that are
systemic or of a structural nature. Therefore, they are to be identiﬁed in
complex constellations between the economic system and communities
or parts of a regional/global population.
With respect to the relation between the global trade of agricultural
commodities at the ﬁnancial markets and world hunger, the ‘colliding
regimes’ shall be explicitly identiﬁed: On the one hand there is the urban
and rural poor population in the poorest development countries who
suffer from a violation of their right to food, and on the other hand there
are proﬁt-oriented business enterprises that take part in ﬁnancial affairs
that may have negative impacts on the social, cultural, and economic
rights of the affected groups and individuals. Therefore, a conﬂict can be
identiﬁed between the economic system and economic, social and cul-
tural rights of communities, groups and individuals.
This paper examines the question whether the voluntary mechanism
of Non-ﬁnancial Reporting (NfR) is able to manage regime collisions
between the economic system and global (social, cultural, and economic)
human rights. The following sections will introduce this mechanism as it
is meant to operate and then look at a practical example in a case study
on food speculation. The paper will then address shortcomings of NfR in
7 For a deﬁnition of the term/phenomenon ‘ﬁnancialization’ see United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and Arbeiterkammer Wien, ‘Price Formation in
Financialized commodity markets: The Role of Information’, pp. 13ff.
8 See Oxfam Germany, ‘Mit Essen Spielt Man Nicht!’, pp. 7, 13ff. For the impacts of high
food prices on the rural and urban poor population see Ivanic and Martin, ‘Implications of
Higher Global Food Prices for Poverty in Low Income Countries’.
9 De Schutter, ‘Food Commodities Speculation and Food Price Crises’, pp. 1, 8.
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practice and outline its potential before concluding with a discussion of
ways for further development.
Non-ﬁnancial Reporting
Because of their complexity, these regime collisions pose an enormous
challenge to transnational human rights protection. In the last two
decades there has been much effort to establish human rights protection
as a core business concern and to tie business actors to human rights
obligations. There are many initiatives and approaches on the national,
regional, international and transnational level, which aim to make cor-
porations accountable for human rights abuses. Still, besides the question
if corporations should be legally bound by human rights, questions
regarding the means and extent of a direct obligation remain highly
controversial. While the international community failed to implement a
UN-based treaty regarding general human rights obligations of private
actors,10 there are many UN-based, state-based or private undertakings
that aim to hold corporations accountable11. These instruments have in
common that they operate on a ‘voluntary basis’ and that they do not
contain legally binding provisions for business enterprises.
One instrument of increasing attention is the concept of NfR.12 NfR
can be best described in contrast to ﬁnancial Reporting (fR): While fR’s
10 UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Sub-Commission on Promotion & Pro-
tection of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, Draft Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 of 26 August 2003. For the
drafting process and the reasons for the failure to adopt the ‘draft norms’ see Backer,
‘Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nations’ Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social
Responsibility in International Law’; Kinley and Chambers, ‘The UN Human Rights
Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public International Law’; Weiß-
brodt and Kruger, ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and
other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’.
11 Some of the most prominent instruments are the Guidelines of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regarding the duty of multinational
corporations (Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises), the Tripartite Declaration of the
International Labour Organization (ILO) concerning multinational enterprises and social
policy, the Global Compact program of the UN, and ﬁnally the ‘Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” Framework’ proposed by the UN Special Representative John Ruggie.
12 Also known as social accounting, social and environmental accounting, corporate social
reporting, corporate social responsibility reporting, and non-ﬁnancial accounting.
228 addressing collisions
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316411230.010
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Cambridge University Press, on 21 Mar 2018 at 10:14:29, subject to the Cambridge
purpose is to deliver ﬁnancial information of a company in the form of a
balance sheet or an annual ﬁnancial report to shareholders, lenders and
the tax authority, NfR can be described as a process of communicating
information on social and environmental impacts and effects of business
conduct to interested stakeholders. The report itself can take the form of
an annex to the annual ﬁnancial report, a sustainability report or a stand-
alone human rights report. The European Commission assumes that the
global number of non-ﬁnancial reports per year increased from almost
zero in 1992 to approximately 4,000 in 2010.13 Still, while 80 per cent of
the world’s 250 largest companies report on their sustainability, about
94 per cent of the total nearly 42,000 EU ‘large’ companies currently do
not disclose non-ﬁnancial information.14
NfR in general has its origin in the concept of Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) and the traditional fR approaches.15 There are
many global initiatives that deal with NfR.16 The best known private
initiative in the ﬁeld of NfR is the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI).17
Another initiative that recently gained widespread attention is the
Reporting and Assurance Frameworks Initiative (RAFI).18 All of these
reporting initiatives have in common that their aim is to assist companies
in the preparation of reports on non-ﬁnancial information. Therefore,
they offer reporting frameworks – also called reporting standards,
reporting schemes or guidelines – that guide the companies in creating
13 European Commission, Impact Assessment, SWD(2013) 127 ﬁnal, (16 April 2013), p. 10.
14 Ibid.
15 For further information on origin, main actors, and used terminology see v. Wensen,
Broer, Klein, and Knopf, ‘The State of Play in Sustainability Reporting in the EU’, pp.
14ff.
16 On the global level there are initiatives, offered both by non governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), which are completely
voluntary like the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the ISO 26 000,
ILO Tri-partite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and
Social Policies, the UN ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework on Business and
Human Rights proposed by the UN Special Representative John Ruggie and the Global
Reporting Initiative (GRI).
17 For information on aims, structures, and practices of the GRI see the GRI’s homepage,
www.globalreporting.org. For the history of GRI, internal organisation, and major actors
within the GRI framework see Brown, de Jong, and Levy, ‘Building Institutions Based on
Information Disclosure’.
18 RAFI is a three-year initiative that aims to, inter alia, develop a framework for good
reporting on the basis of the UN Guidning Principles. For further information on the
participating organisations and RAFIs core drafts and documents see
www.ungpreporting.org/.
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a report and disclosing relevant information.19 Most of the initiatives,
like the GRI and RAFI, follow a so-called multi-stakeholder approach,
i.e., the initiatives create and improve their reporting frameworks by
involving all relevant stakeholders, like corporations, investors, rating
agencies, auditors, scientists, and NGOs in the process of development.
The frameworks are subdivided into different sections. The different
sections usually refer to information regarding, for example, the organ-
isational proﬁle of the organisation, governance and policy aspects,
strategies for accessing impacts and to integrate ﬁndings of impact
assessments into its performance and questions relating to remediation
processes concerning affected individuals or communities.20
While all of the initiatives dealing with NfR are strictly ‘voluntary’21,
there are many countries that have passed more or less mandatory NfR
legislation.22 In October 2014, the EU passed a directive that aims to
harmonise existing national NfR legislation and establish it where
member states have not yet passed regulation in this ﬁeld.23 The EU’s
19 The most used reporting schemes are the Guidelines of GRI and the United Nations
Global Compact Communication on Progress (UNGC COP). Beside that, there are many
other standards which partially only refer to special business sectors like the Carbon
Disclosure Project (CDP) and the Connected Reporting Framework (CRF) (for further
initiatives see v. Wensen, Broer, Klein, and Knopf, ‘The State of Play in Sustainability
Reporting in the EU', Appendix C, pp. 135ff.).
20 See RAFI, ‘Draft UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework’; GRI, ‘G4 Sustainability
Reporting Guidelines’.
21 On the international level there are voices that on the one hand demand universal
initiatives and on the other hand strive for legally binding approaches and standards.
On the UN level, the outcome document of the UN Conference on Sustainable Develop-
ment (Rio +20) calls for a universal framework on non-ﬁnancial-reporting (General
Assembly, (2012), UN Doc A/RES/66/288, paragraph 47.). The latest report of the United
Nations Secretary General´s High-level Panel on Global Sustainability argues for a
mandatory reporting framework (General Assembly, (2012), UN Doc A/RES/66/700,
paragraph 166.).
22 For example The Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, United Kingdom, Finland, Spain,
France, and Sweden. For a brief summary on the recent developments in some of these
member states see European Commission, Impact Assessment, SWD(2013) 127 ﬁnal, (16
April 2013), Annex III, pp. 49ff.; for references to the corresponding legislation see
European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ), ‘Principles & Pathways: Legal oppor-
tunities to improve Europe’s corporative accountability framework’, p. 11, fn. 5.
23 European Parliament and the Council, Directive 2014/95/EU of 22 October 2014
amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-ﬁnancial and diversity
information by certain large undertakings and groups, OJ L 330/1 of 15 November
2014. The EU’s Directive requests mandatory NfR without providing explicit enforce-
ment or sanctions for violations of the obligations. It also aims to unburden small and
medium sized companies. According to this, the new EU’s Directive provides that only
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directive itself offers no reporting guidelines or standards for the
disclosure of non-ﬁnancial information.24 It states speciﬁc matters that
shall be the minimum-content of the reports like environmental, social
and employee matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and
bribery matters. Besides that, it names criteria that shall be subject to the
reports:
(a) a brief description of the undertaking’s business model;
(b) a description of the policies pursued by the undertaking in relation to
the matters, including due diligence processes implemented;
(c) the outcome of those policies;
(d) the principle risks related to those matters linked to the undertak-
ing’s operations including, where relevant and proportionate, its
business relationships, products or services which are likely to cause
adverse impacts to those areas, and how the undertaking manages
those risks;
(e) non-ﬁnancial key performance indicators relevant to the particular
business.25
To guarantee the disclosure of this information, the Directive
instructs the EU Member States to provide that companies rely on
national, Union-based or international frameworks like, for example,
the GRI.26
There is a consensus among civil society, governments, companies and
their stake- and shareholders that NfR can be a useful management tool,
an important risk management mechanism and a crucial source of infor-
mation for affected communities, groups, and other shareholders that
aim to assess the impacts of business’ activities.27 Furthermore, there is a
growing demand of government agencies, investors, stock exchanges, and
other ﬁnancial institutions for transparency regarding a company’s
undertakings that are public-interest entities with more than 500 employees should be
subject to the new requirements. European subsidiary companies or parent companies,
which are also subsidiary companies, shall only be exempt from non-ﬁnancial reporting
obligations if they and their subsidiaries are consolidated in the reports of another
company.
24 Under Art. 2 of the Directive, the European Commission is advised to prepare ‘non-
binding guidelines on methodology for reporting non-ﬁnancial information’ by 6 Decem-
ber 2016.
25 Directive 2014/95/EU of 22 October 2014. 26 Ibid.
27 See European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ), ‘EU Legislation on Non-ﬁnancial
Reporting by Companies’, p. 2; Amnesty International, ‘Non-Financial Reporting:
Amnesty International Position Paper’.
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‘human rights performance’. That is why, besides the promotion of
responsibility and transparency, efﬁciency of capital markets and the
performance of companies are major concerns and objectives of NfR.28
For these reasons, next to affected communities, groups or individuals,
NGOs, the media, consumers, employees and trade unions, it is also
investors and analysts who are the most common readers.29
The idea of NfR in general is not to create an immediate accountability
of enterprises for human rights related actions. NfR does not mainly refer
to a compensation for human rights violations, but rather aims to
establish human rights protection as a core business concern.30 Never-
theless, NfR is not just a tool to prepare the way for, for example, civil
actions. It is an instrument of strengthening human rights through a
process of internal self-reﬂexion.
The following section will introduce a case study on food speculation
to examine NfR’s actual shortcomings and its potential for managing
regime collisions between the economic system and global (social, cul-
tural, and economic) human rights.
Case study: food speculation, stakeholder engagement
and NfR in practice
In 2013, Oxfam Germany accused several German companies, inter alia
the Allianz Group, of making proﬁt with ﬁnancial transactions that bear
a signiﬁcant risk to cause hunger in the world.31 The Allianz Group
appears to be a major player in the ﬁeld of food commodities speculation.
Oxfam Germany states that in 2011 the Allianz Group and its subsidiar-
ies held 5 commodity funds with an overall ﬁxed asset of 18.44 billion
euros, of which approximately 6.24 billion euros cover agricultural
commodities.32
28 See Human Rights Reporting and Assurance Frameworks Initiative (RAFI), ‘Draft UN
Guiding Principles Reporting Framework’, p. 1.
29 For further information on the readers’ perspectives on sustainability reporting see v.
Wensen, Broer, Klein, and Knopf, ‘The State of Play in Sustainability Reporting in the
EU', pp. 85ff.
30 Augenstein, ‘Study of the Legal Framework on Human Rights and the Environment
Applicable to European Enterprises Operating Outside the European Union’, p. 75,
paragraph 232.
31 Oxfam Germany, ‘Mit Essen Spielt Man Nicht!’; also see Oxfam Germany, ‘Oxfam
Hintergrundpapier, Hungerroulette’.
32 Oxfam Germany, ‘Mit Essen Spielt Man Nicht!’, pp. 30ff.
232 addressing collisions
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316411230.010
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Cambridge University Press, on 21 Mar 2018 at 10:14:29, subject to the Cambridge
In March 2012, Oxfam Germany contacted the Allianz Group and
asked for a statement on the connection between speculation on agricul-
tural commodities and global food prices.33 The Allianz Group
responded to the request by stating that their investments do not affect
the demand on the physical markets and therefore do not jack up prices
of agricultural commodities.34 Furthermore, the Allianz Group and
Oxfam Germany held several meetings in which the Allianz Group tried
to refute Oxfam’s allegations. In an open letter Jay Ralph, member of the
board of the Allianz SE and chairman of the Environmental, Social and
Governance Board of the Allianz SE, defended his company against
persistent criticism.35 In order to defend itself, the Allianz Group referred
to internal audits and investigations that show that their business activ-
ities do not have a negative impact on food prices. At the same time, the
Allianz Group refused to provide or publish its internal information.36
The Allianz Group reports on non-ﬁnancial information on the basis
of the GRI Guidelines. The sustainability report of 2012 reacts to the
allegations by several NGOs in the form of an interview with the CEO of
the Allianz SE, Michael Diekmann:
Question:
‘In 2012, NGOs criticized banks, hedge funds and insurance companies
for investing in agricultural commodities. Does Allianz view that criti-
cism as an occasion to rethink its investments?’
Answer M. Diekmann:
‘We did review those investments. We don’t invest in agricultural com-
modities, but serve farmers and buyers as a risk partner in the futures
market (where only price risks are traded). In return for a premium, we
take on the risk posed by price volatility in the spot markets (where
commodities are later traded). In that way, we ensure a reliable income
33 Ibid. 34 Ibid.
35 Ralph, ‘Offener Brief an Oxfam’, (15 October 2013), www.allianz.com/de/presse/news/
unternehmen/standpunkte/news_2013-10-14.html.
36 Schiessl, ‘Agrarrohstoffe: Streit über die Spekulations-Studie’, Spiegel-Online, (3 February
2013), www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/ﬂassbeck-gegen-agrarspekulation-a-880775.html;
Kwasniewski, ‘Nahrungsmittelinvestments: Allianz wehrt sich gegen Spekulationsvor-
würfe’, Spiegel-Online, (15 October 2013), www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/alli
anz-wehrt-sich-gegen-vorwuerfe-der-nahrungsmittelspekulationen-a-928029.html.
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for farmers and reliable prices for buyers. In those operations we don’t
need to ‘bet on high prices’, because we can earn our risk premium even
if prices are low. We believe the criticism of Allianz on this topic is
unjustiﬁed. But I must also say that it has raised our awareness of the
problem. In dialogue with experts and NGOs, we want to ﬁnd
solutions that will help us address undisputed causes of hunger’.37
Oxfam Germany states that until now the Allianz Group has not
changed its activities in this ﬁeld. In November 2013, Foodwatch sub-
mitted an analysis in response to studies in favour of the position the
Allianz Group and other companies involved in food speculations. It
concludes that speculation on agricultural commodities is quite likely to
have negative impacts on food prices.38 Meanwhile, Foodwatch
published a ‘for internal use only’ working paper by the Allianz Group,
which concludes that ‘taking into consideration the huge inﬂux of funds
and non-traditional participants into commodity markets, it cannot be
totally dismissed, that speculation at least supports excessive price
developments’39.
Shortcomings of NfR in practice: does NfR improve business
behaviour?
The fact that actual NfR initiatives are very praxis orientated
makes their frameworks generally a practical tool for companies to
disclose non-ﬁnancial information. There is hardly any doubt that
elaborating a report makes companies in some way reﬂect the impacts
of their activities on human rights. To manage writing a report,
corporations have to establish a ‘task force’ or a ‘working group’ that
needs to communicate with every relevant internal actor and has to
37 Allianz Group, ‘Sustainability Factbook 2012’, (2013), www.allianz.com/v_
1363290088000/media/responsibility/documents/ALLIANZ_Sustainability_Factbook.pdf,
p. 3.
38 On the controversial discussion between foodwatch and Ingo Pies et al. who argue that
speculation on agricultural commodities has no impact on food prices, see foodwatch,
‘foodwatch-Argumentationspapier zur Studie “Finanzspekulation und Nahrungsmittel-
preise” von Prof. Hans-Heinrich Bass’; Bass, ‘Finanzspekulation und Nahrungsmittel-
preise: Anmerkungen zum Stand der Forschung’; Pies and Will, ‘Finanzspekulation mit
Agrarrohstoffen’; Pies and Glauben, ‘Wissenschaftliche Stellungnahme zum Argumenta-
tionspapier von Foodwatch’.
39 Allianz Group, ‘Working Paper: Is Speculation to Blame for Rising Food Prices?’, p. 11.
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examine almost all sectors of the company.40 In addition, the working
group has to explore internal structures (governance), supply chains,
subsidiaries and their activities. Therefore, writing a sustainability report
necessarily promotes a company’s awareness regarding internal struc-
tures and partnerships that are relevant for human rights related
impacts.
Nevertheless, the case study shows that the current NfR in practice
often fails to achieve its objectives. Regarding the allegations made by
Oxfam Germany, the Allianz Group reports that they reviewed the
allegations and that they do not invest in agricultural commodities.
Major questions that are components of common reporting frameworks
were left unanswered:
How did the company assess the alleged impacts?41 What were the
ﬁndings of the evitable assessments?42 How does the company integrate
its ﬁndings into its decision-making processes regarding its further
actions?43 How does the company address tensions between the identiﬁed
risks and other business objectives?44 What exactly has the company done
to address the risk?45 How does the company address individuals, groups
or communities concerns and complaints?46
The Allianz Group did not address the allegations in detail. Even though
it turned out that there were internal studies that delivered explicit
results, they did not report how exactly they assessed the alleged impacts
40 For the internal challenges of CSR measures to a company see Scherer, Palazzo, and Seidl,
‘Managing Legitimacy in Complex and Heterogeneous Environments’.
41 See RAFI, ‘Draft UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework’, Part C, pp. 11ff.; GRI,
‘G4 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines’, G4–pp. 24ff. (Stakeholder Engagement),
pp. 29–30, G4–pp. 34ff. (Governance), pp. 36ff., G4–DMA, p. 46, G4–HR9 (Human
Rights Assessments), p. 74, G4–HR12 (Human Rights Grievance Mechanisms), p. 75.
42 See RAFI, ‘Draft UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework’, Part B, C, pp. 11ff.; GRI,
‘G4 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines’, G4–pp. 24ff. (Stakeholder Engagement),
pp. 29–30, G4–pp. 34ff. (Governance), pp. 36ff.
43 Ibid.
44 See RAFI, ‘Draft UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework’, Part C4.2, p. 12; GRI,
‘G4 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines’, G4–pp. 24ff. (Stakeholder Engagement),
pp. 29–30, G4–pp. 34ff. (Governance), pp. 36ff.
45 See RAFI, ‘Draft UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework’, Part C4, p. 12; GRI, ‘G4
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines’, G4–pp. 24ff. (Stakeholder Engagement), pp. 29–30,
G4–pp. 34ff. (Governance), pp. 36ff.
46 See RAFI, ‘Draft UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework’, Part C2, pp. 11–2, C6,
p. 13; GRI, ‘G4 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines’, G4–pp. 24ff. (Stakeholder Engage-
ment), pp. 29–30, G4–pp. 34ff. (Governance), pp. 36ff., G4–HR12 (Human Rights
Grievance Mechanisms), p. 75.
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(especially regarding the involved sections and departments of the com-
pany) and what ﬁndings were made. The statement that they reviewed
the allegations does not contribute to transparency. It is not comprehen-
sible, if the company actually reviewed the allegations and what impacts
these reviews had on further activities and decision-making processes.
There was no information on the internal praxis in dealing with the
tensions between the identiﬁed risks for the increase of food prices and
expected proﬁts.
The reporting practice of NfR brings up the question of whether NfR
does actually improve business behaviour. Do companies actually take
into account human rights in decision-making processes? Rob Gray’s
answer to these questions is: ‘no-one can know – but it is probable’.47
Because there are no monitoring and evaluation mechanisms and since
the reporting requirements are too frail for ‘greenwashing’ (i.e., that
companies often misuse their reports to create a false ‘green image’) the
information given by participating companies cannot be veriﬁed and
there is no guarantee that the information is comprehensive. Therefore,
due to a lack of transparency the grade of the implementation of human
rights in the internal structures and processes remains unclear.
Apart from the case study, many stakeholders argue that companies
often misuse their reports to create a false ‘green image’ (‘greenwashing’).
William S. Laufer states that the emergence of the term ‘greenwashing’
reﬂects
an increasing apprehension that at least some corporations creatively
manage their reputations with the public, ﬁnancial community and regu-
lators, so as to hide deviance, deﬂect attributions of fault, obscure the
nature of the problem or allegation, reattribute blame, ensure an entity’s
reputation and, ﬁnally, seek to appear in a leadership position.48
Some companies ‘engage in complex strategies and counter strategies
that serve to shift the focus and attention away from the ﬁrm, create
confusion, undermine credibility, criticise viable alternatives, and
47 Gray, ‘Does Sustainability Reporting Improve Corporate Behaviour?’, p. 82.
48 Laufer, ‘Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing’, p. 255; see also Deegan and
Rankin, ‘Do Australian companies report environmental news objectively?’; e.g. Boiral
argues that sustainability reports (in this case under the A and A+ GRI standard, which
generally is said to be the strictest scheme in the ﬁeld of reporting standards) ‘can be
viewed as simulacra that camouﬂage real sustainable-development problems, presenting
an idealized version of company situations’ (Boiral, ‘Sustainability Reports as Simulacra?’,
p. 1061). For deﬁciencies in the UNGC COP framework also see Deva, Regulating
Corporate Human Rights Violations, pp. 96ff.
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deceptively posture ﬁrm objectives, commitments, and accomplish-
ments’.49 ‘Greenwashing’, therefore, goes along with the possibility of
reporting organisations to decide freely which information to publish
and how to design the reports. While common guidelines use speciﬁc
indicators to guide the participating companies, the frameworks still give
companies wide latitude on how to shape the reports with the effect that
reports are often designed like advertising brochures or catalogues,50
containing only selected information or lacking relevant information
and serving as a platform for presenting ‘green’ products or
technologies.51
For these reasons, stakeholders further criticise that the reports are
often low in credibility, comparability, and comprehensiveness and
therefore of little use in practice.52 They tend to be difﬁcult to under-
stand, are highly inconsistent and provide extensive unnecessary infor-
mation, whilst failing to provide the vital facts.53 Some potential readers
stress that there is a high degree of mistrust of the companies’ intentions
and that they prefer direct means of communication with companies to
obtain the required information.54 NGOs, affected communities or
groups and civil society in general see transparency, standardisation,
completeness, external assurance, a mandatory requirement and supervi-
sion mechanisms for NfR as major aspects for improving current NfR.55
Finally, the current lack of unsustainability and the severe collisions in
the relationship ‘business and human rights’ suggest that either com-
panies are still within a initial phase regarding the internalisation of
human rights, or company activities actually do not consider human
49 Laufer, ‘Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing’, p. 255.
50 See for example H&M’s latest sustainability report. The report is designed like a fashion
catalogue and, therefore, contains a lot of pictures, animations, and images of H&M’s
products or models presenting H&M’s products: H&M, ‘Conscious Actions – Sustain-
ability Report 2013’, (2014), http://sustainability.hm.com/en/sustainability/downloads-
resources/reports/sustainability-reports.html.
51 See e.g. the studies of Skouloudisa, Evangelinosa, and Kourmousis, ‘Assessing non-
ﬁnancial reports according to the Global Reporting Initiative guidelines: evidence from
Greece’; Chapman and Milne, ‘The triple bottom line: how New Zealand companies
measure up’; Mahoney, Thorne, Cecil, and LaGore, ‘A research note on standalone
corporate social responsibility reports: Signaling or greenwashing?’.
52 Tilt, ‘The Inﬂuence of External Pressure Groups on Corporate Social Disclosure’, p. 63.
53 European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ), ‘EU Legislation on Non-ﬁnancial
Reporting by Companies’, p. 1.
54 v. Wensen, Broer, Klein, and Knopf, ‘The State of Play in Sustainability Reporting in the
EU’, p. 86.
55 Ibid., pp. 93ff.
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rights matters in their decision making processes at all. If the former is
the case, the only way to improve the current (unsatisfactory) situation is
to make structures and processes transparent and open to a method that
will promote and achieve an internalisation of human rights in business
conduct. If the latter is the case, then ‘company disclosure needs to reﬂect
this so that we can discount the empty rhetoric’ and radically reconstruct
the given structures of binding business to human rights.56
The potential of NfR
If one considers that even the best reporting standard cannot guarantee
that the disclosed information is comprehensive, credible, and misused
for ‘greenwashing’ then what is the future for NfR and can it contribute
to tie business to human rights obligations?
Promoting self-reﬂexion through monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms
Taking into account the small number of reporting companies and the
vast amount of structural violations of human rights, it can be questioned
if voluntary initiatives like the GRI or concepts that promote voluntarism
in general, like CSR, are an expression of actual self-restraint in terms of
self-constitutionalisation of the economic system.57
Anyhow, with reference to systems theory it can be argued that only
the economic system or business actors decide whether they adjust their
communications in favour of their systems’ social environment. Because
the systems remain autopoietic58 and, therefore, internal communica-
tions only refer to previous internal communications; the difﬁcult task to
reciprocally harmonise the function of a social system with its output in
favour of its social environment can only be accomplished by a system-
internal reﬂexion.59 This system-internal reﬂexion can be initiated from
the outside of a system, but it cannot be replaced.60 Gunther Teubner
states that these initiations can only be successful if they orientate
56 See Gray, ‘Does Sustainability Reporting Improve Corporate Behaviour?’, p. 82.
57 For the concept of self-constitutionalisation of business enterprises see Teubner, ‘Selbst-
Konstitutionalisierung transnationaler Unternehmen?’; for the conditions and chances of
a human rights based self-restraint of economic regimes see Teubner, ‘Die anonyme
Matrix’.
58 Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, p. 757.
59 Teubner, Verfassungsfragmente, p. 134. 60 Ibid.
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themselves on the system’s ways of self-change and aim to give impulses
that can be translated into inner growth processes.61 The task would be to
combine massive external pressure and irritation with intrinsic
changes.62
This very much describes the idea of an NfR framework equipped with
a proper monitoring and enforcement system. Such a framework could
serve to improve the internalisation of human rights matters within the
structures of business enterprises. Internal learning effects are combined
with external pressure, assistance and guidance. NfR would institutional-
ise a mandatory framework for self-reﬂexion within the economic
system.63
Regarding a company’s internal self-reﬂexion, a reporting procedure
with a monitoring and enforcement mechanism would have advantages
over common individual complaints procedures in several ways.
First, while individual complaints procedures only cover individual
cases, reporting procedures can address structural human rights prob-
lems where it is difﬁcult to identify victims of misconduct or to prove
causality between misconduct and affected people.64 Second, decisions
or ﬁndings only have legal validity for representational facts, and access
of a speciﬁc conﬂict to, for example, civil courts, and often depends on
contingencies, while in report procedures continuous negotiations can
be held on speciﬁc cases and/or structural shortcomings that may lead
to a process of appropriation and internalisation of human rights
matters within the internal structures of an involved company.65 Third,
monitoring and enforcement bodies could have several options on how
to react to misconduct: They could react to the reports by expressing
concerns about corporate conduct or concrete suggestions/proposals
with respect to speciﬁc matters. In contrast to individual complaint
procedures, reporting procedures are characterised by argumentative
debates on social struggles, not by ruling speciﬁc problems.66 Through
61 Ibid., pp. 134–5 62 Ibid., p. 135.
63 See Hess, ‘Social Reporting: A Reﬂexive Law Approach to Corporate Social Responsive-
ness’, who refers to Teubner, ‘Reﬂexives Recht’.
64 Davy, ‘Welche rechtlichen Grundregeln müssen für einen wirksamen Menschen-
rechtsschutz gelten?’, pp. 255–6.
65 Ibid., pp. 255, 258.
66 Fischer-Lescano, ‘Der Kampf um die Internetverfassung’, p. 968.
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follow-up procedures,67 committees could pursue the further implemen-
tation of the previously communicated concerns and suggestions.
Because of the lack of evaluation or monitoring mechanisms in
actual NfR, a direct response to the single reports within the reporting
system is not possible. There is no guarantee that reports are exhaust-
ive and there is no possibility to follow-up and efﬁciently support
further actions. Reporting companies receive no feedback and there
is no room for argumentative debates – a speciﬁc and individual
learning process is not possible. Therefore, it is up to the companies
to evaluate, recondition and incorporate report-related ﬁndings. The
present case study proves that the learning factor for corporations is
very low. A reporting procedure directed by a monitoring body could
have served as a platform to debate Oxfam Germany’s allegations, to
evaluate the actions of the Allianz Group that have been taken to
assess the alleged impacts and to consult on solutions to settle the
present conﬂict.
On that note, for ﬁnancial reporting Hong Phu Dao very rightly
pointed out that ‘a high quality ﬁnancial reporting requirement . . .
requires also a mechanism to oversee the appropriate application of the
standards’ and it ‘depends both on the quality of accounting standards
and the effectiveness of regulatory enforcement of these standards’
because ‘in the absence of adequate enforcement, the accounting rules
may remain simply requirements on paper’.68
Inclusion of civil society in monitoring and enforcement mechanisms
Another major shortcoming of actual NfR is the fact that it does not
deliver a proper forum for stakeholders (especially for civil society) to
communicate criticism towards companies. Currently, the only way for
NGOs to inﬂuence NfR, for example, under the GRI, is to take part in the
67 For the follow up procedures within the UN state report framework, especially the
inclusion of NGOs in this process see Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (CESCR), ‘Report on the Twentieth and Twenty-First Sessions’, E/2000/22,
E/C.12/1999/11, (2001), paragraph 38ff.; CESCR, ‘Substantive Issues Arising in the
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights –
NGO participation in the activities of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights’, E/C.12/2000/6 of 7 July 2000, paragraph 25ff.
68 Dao, ‘Monitoring Compliance with IFRS’, p. 108.
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GRI’s ‘development process’69 or the ‘monitoring program’.70 Both
options have in common that the subject of negotiation is the conﬁgur-
ation of the Guidelines and not the reports themselves. That is one
reason, why in the present case no NGO explicitly referred to the Allianz
Group’s sustainability report. The report actually played no role in
dealing with the conﬂict.
Experiences from the UN-based state reporting procedures71 have
shown that the inclusion of civil society in the monitoring mechanisms
is a very effective tool to address misconduct. The inclusion of civil
society in the reporting, monitoring and follow-up process would signiﬁ-
cantly increase the extent of external pressure. By giving civil society a
tool to scandalise, directly address and making public misconduct72
towards the company or group concerned and to import these concerns
into a process of evaluation, speciﬁc impacts and incidents as well as
issues of general relevance can be addressed. Institutionalised arenas for
hosting conﬂicts between civil society and business enterprises in general
would increase societies’ democratic control over the economic system.
The inclusion of civil society as well as other stakeholders can be
established by giving NGOs the possibility to submit so-called shadow
reports73 or by incorporating counter-accounting.74 Thereby, reporting
companies could be confronted with speciﬁc incidents, negative business
impacts or business activities-related issues. In turn, the monitoring
69 See the Hompage of the GRI, www.globalreporting.org/standards/g4/g4-developments/
Pages/default.aspx
70 See the Hompage of the GRI, www.globalreporting.org/standards/g4/Pages/
G4monitoring.aspx.
71 For an overview of the UN state reporting system see Kretzmer, ‘Human Rights, State
Reports’, with further references; Keller, ‘Reporting Systems’.
72 Liese, ‘Epistula (non) Erubescit’, pp. 59–60.
73 For the role of NGOs in the monitoring system of Human Right Treaty Bodies see
Clapham, ‘UN Human Rights Reporting Procedures: An NGO Perspective’; Klein, The
Monitoring System of Human Rights Treaty Obligations; Brett, ‘The Role of NGOs – An
Overview’.
74 Boiral deﬁnes counter-accounting ‘as the process of identifying and reporting infor-
mation on organisations’ signiﬁcant economic, environmental and social issues that
comes from external or unofﬁcial sources (expert reports, research papers, online jour-
nals, studies from NGOs, government publications, legal proceedings, etc.) in view of
verifying, complementing or countering organisations’ ofﬁcial reports on their perform-
ance and achievements’ (Boiral, ‘Sustainability Reports as Simulacra?’, p. 1037). For the
Role of civil society and stakeholders in the ﬁeld of corporate accounting also see
O’Dwyer, ‘Stakeholder democracy’; Adams, ‘The ethical, social and environmental
reporting performance portrayal gap’; Gallahofer, Haslam, Monk, and Roberts, ‘The
emancipatory potential of online reporting’.
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system could respond to the information given by the companies and the
NGOs by handing out recommendations or stressing the companies’
obligation to report on certain aspects.
Therefore, besides the implementation of monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms, a major task for actual NfR is to effectively include civil
society by providing a right to claim transparency in speciﬁc ﬁelds of
business activities or the possibility to actively inﬂuence the evaluation
process. Ingeborg Maus has noted that to avoid replication of factual
positions of power in negotiating positions, which can be observed in
actual NfR regarding the problem of ‘greenwashing’, it is essential to
empower the underprivileged positions by mandatory legal mechan-
isms.75 Spaces of autonomy have to be legally ensured by legally framed
negotiating positions.76
Legal foundation for introducing monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms
To sum up, NfR has the potential to serve as an effective means of
identifying and tackling collisions of human rights regimes and the
economic system. But what are the odds that NfR will achieve its full
potential? Amongst private reporting initiatives there are no plans to
bring into focus better monitoring and enforcement of the reporting
process. The most signiﬁcant obstacle for introducing proper NfR legis-
lation is the lack of political will. Some Member States, for example,
Germany, have explicitly expressed rejection towards the plans of the EU
to pass mandatory NfR:
The federal government explicitly militates against new legal disclosure on
social and ecological information in the context of CSR. Such obligations
would be a renunciation of the principle of voluntariness und would be
accompanied by an extensive administrative burden, especially for small
and medium size companies.77
75 See Maus, ‘Perspektiven “reﬂexiven Rechts” im Kontext gegenwärtiger Deregulierungs-
tendenzen’.
76 Ibid., p. 404.
77 Positionspapier der Bundesregierung zur Mitteilung der Europäischen Kommission,
‘Eine neue EU-Strategie (2011–14) für die soziale Verantwortung der Unternehmen
(CSR)’, (KOM 2011) 681 endg., (18 November 2011), (translation by author).
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In contrast to this, there are concrete points of contact for the introduc-
tion of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms both in the EU’s
Directive itself and in international law.
To refute the reservations of some states, one could ﬁrst refer to states’
obligations in international law with respect to regulating private actors’
activities. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(CESCR) has repeatedly stated that states have an obligation to
effectively safeguard rights holders against infringements of their eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights involving corporate actors, by establish-
ing appropriate laws, regulations, as well as monitoring, investigation and
accountability procedures to set and enforce standards for the perform-
ance of corporations. As the Committee has repeatedly explained, non-
compliance with this obligation can come through action or inaction . . .
States Parties should also take steps to prevent human rights contraven-
tions abroad by corporations which have their main seat under their
jurisdiction, without infringing the sovereignty or diminishing the obliga-
tions of the host States under the Covenant.78
The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,79 proposed
by the UN Special Representative on business & human rights John
Ruggie, conﬁrm the practice of the committee. The ﬁrst Principle clearly
stresses that states ‘must protect against human rights abuse within their
territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including business enter-
prises. This requires taking appropriate steps to prevent, investigate,
punish, and redress such abuse through effective policies, legislation,
regulations, and adjudication’. Like the CESCR, the Guiding Principles
clearly stress the importance of steps to prevent companies from violat-
ing human rights. Principle three points out that states should ‘provide
78 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), ‘Statement on the Obli-
gations of States Parties Regarding the Corporate Sector and Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights’, E/C.12/2011/1 of 11 May 2011; also see CESCR, ‘General Comment
No. 14’, E/C.12/2000/4 of 11 August 2000, paragraph 39; CESCR, ‘Concluding Observa-
tion: Germany’, E/C.12/DEU/CO/5 of 12 July 2011, paragraph 10; The ‘Maastricht
Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations in the Area of ESC Rights’ (De Schutter, Eide,
et al., ‘Commentary’) refer to the practice of the Committee and other human rights
bodies when stating a state obligation to regulate private conduct (Principle 24) and states
must adopt and enforce measures to protect economic, social, and cultural rights ‘as
regards business enterprises, where the corporation, or its parent or controlling company,
has its centre of activity, is registered or domiciled, or has its main place of business or
substantial business activities, in the State concerned’ (Principle 25).
79 UN Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, ‘UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights’, HR/PUB/11/04, (2011).
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effective guidance to business enterprises on how to respect human rights
throughout their operations’ and ‘encourage, or where appropriate
require, business enterprises to communicate how they address their
human rights impacts’ to comply with their duty to protect human
rights. Reporting procedures, if equipped with a monitoring mechanism,
are an effective tool to guide the reporting party to compliance.
In this respect, international human rights law obligates states80 to take
effective legislative steps to regulate corporations’ conduct with regard to
the progressive realisation of rights, i.e., as recognised in the CESCR. On
the one hand, it can be argued that states in some respect have a margin
of appreciation in the area of extraterritorial jurisdiction over corporate
human rights abuses and, therefore, the boundaries between what is
legally binding and what is politically opportune are often blurred.81
On the other hand, there is obviously a lack of regulation in this ﬁeld,
especially when it comes to monitoring and enforcement. There is no
doubt that proper NfR can be rated as an effective tool to improve
corporations’ behaviour as regards human rights. To date, states such
as Germany82 have not taken adequate legal or political steps to prevent
their own citizens and national entities from violating economic, social
and cultural rights in other countries. Appropriate and effective legisla-
tive steps, for example, proper mandatory NfR, are long overdue.
The Directive supports this assumption. It contains a passage that can
only be understood as a request to the Member States to create proced-
ures to monitor and enforce the disclosure of non-ﬁnancial information:
80 For the question whether EU is obliged by international human rights codiﬁcations see
Fischer-Lescano, Human Rights in Times of Austerity, pp. 23ff. On the relationship
between the EU and member states international human rights obligations see Ahmed
and de Jesús Butler, ‘The European Union and Human Rights’; The Regional Ofﬁce for
Europe of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘The EU and International
Human Rights Law’.
81 Augenstein, ‘Study of the Legal Framework on Human Rights and the Environment
Applicable to European Enterprises Operating Outside the European Union’, p. 77,
paragraph 240; Krennerich, Soziale Menschenrechte, pp. 106, 361–2; CESCR, ‘Statement
on the Obligations of States Parties Regarding the Corporate Sector and Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights’, E/C.12/2011/1 of 11 May 2011; also see CESCR, ‘General Comment
No. 14’, E/C.12/2000/4 of 11 August 2000, paragraph 39.
82 Germanwatch and Miseror demand the German Government to comply with the Euro-
pean Commission’s request (‘Communication: A renewed EU strategy 2011–14 for
Corporate Social Responsibility’, COM (2011) 681 ﬁnal of 25 October 2011) to establish
a plan for the implementation of the UN-Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights (Germanwatch and Miseror, ‘Nationaler Aktionsplan zur Umsetzung der UN-
Leitprinzipien für Wirtschaft und Menschenrechte’).
244 addressing collisions
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316411230.010
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Cambridge University Press, on 21 Mar 2018 at 10:14:29, subject to the Cambridge
Member States should ensure that adequate and effective means exist to
guarantee disclosure of non-ﬁnancial information by undertakings in
compliance with this Directive. To that end, Member States should ensure
that effective national procedures are in place to enforce compliance with
the obligations laid down by this Directive, and that those procedures are
available to all persons and legal entities having a legitimate interest, in
accordance with national law, in ensuring that the provisions of this
Directive are respected.83
For the enforcement of the reporting obligation itself it would be sufﬁ-
cient to simply sanction an omission. To ensure that the content and
substance of the reports are in accordance with the Directives’ obliga-
tions, it requires more than that. Therefore, the Directive advises the
Member States to introduce ‘effective national procedures’ to enforce the
compliance with the Directives’ demands. The previous examination
illustrates that to effectively ensure a compliance with the reporting
obligations, it is indispensable to implement monitoring and enforce-
ment mechanisms that directly deal with the reports and their content.
The EU’s Directive also supports the proposal to open monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms to affected stakeholders by stating that these
national procedures should be available to all persons and legal entities
that have a legitimate interest in ensuring the compliance with the
reporting obligations.
Perspectives for NfR
NfR is only one strategy within a plethora of approaches that try to advance
corporate accountability and therefore generally are aimed at preserving the
autonomy of social systems or regimes against the expansive drive of the
economic system.84 SufﬁcientNfR legislation is an instrumentwith a unique
potential to inﬂuence the rationality of the economic systemand its actors. It
can prepare the ground for countering economic forces that restrain or
block the fulﬁlment of (economic, social, and cultural) human rights.85 The
case study pointed out that reports on non-ﬁnancial information need to be
embedded in a procedure that is open to relevant stakeholders and allows
83 Directive 2014/95/EU of 22 October 2014.
84 For an overview of strategies of implementation on the institutional level (within the
economic system), the national level, and the international level see Deva, Regulating
Corporate Human Rights Violations, pp. 200ff.
85 See Freeman, ‘Conclusion: Reﬂections on the Theory and Practice of Economic and
Social Rights’, p. 386.
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continuous negotiations about business conduct and the internal organisa-
tion of dealing with human rights related misconduct.
However, the proposed development of NfR would face considerable
challenges that should be considered when interpreting the results pre-
sented here. Therefore, this paper should be seen as exploratory – serving
as an impetus for further research that will widen the perspective on the
development of NfR.
First, the precise arrangement of the proposed monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms is a crucial question. Possible solutions vary
from national to regional or global forms of organisation. The adjacency
of regional actors to ‘local’ companies speaks in favour of a national or
regional solution.
Second, the huge amount of potential reporters would be a major task to
manage. The European Commission estimates that there are approximately
42,000 ‘large’ companies operating in the EU. This signiﬁcant fact raises the
question if there could be amonitoring system thatwould be able to evaluate
the huge amount of reports. In this regard, actual practices in fR could serve
as a role model or even a point of contact. The practice of, for example,
European andGermanmonitoring and enforcement bodies in theﬁeld of fR
presents an effective way to deal with the problem of the huge amount of
potential reporters. A concrete monitoring and enforcement procedure will
be launched on two occasions: First, there is an ad-hoc procedure that
begins when a stakeholder informs the body about a speciﬁc misconduct.
Second, there is a progressive proceeding of randomly evaluating reports of
the obligated companies. In the case of Germany, there are two bodies that
monitor and enforce the reporting obligation. The body of the ﬁrst instance
is competent for the actual monitoring and evaluation process. It is set up as
a private association and composed of specialised representatives of all
relevant stakeholders in the ﬁeld of fR. The body of the second instance is
governmental and capable of imposing sanctions and other mandatory
orders on a reviewed company.86
Financial Reporting in practice demonstrates that selective procedures
and a smart mix of governmental and private control in NfR can be the
key for implementing an effective monitoring and enforcement
mechanism.
86 For the organisation of the German ﬁnancial supervisory sytem see Bockmann, Inter-
nationale Koordinierung nationaler Enforcement-Aktivitäten. For the European ﬁnancial
supervisory system see Wymeersch, ‘The reforms of the European Financial Supervisory
System’.
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